A firm has sales of $1,180, net income of $222, net fixed assets of $536, and current assets of $292. The firm has $97 in inventory. What is the common-size balance sheet value of inventory

Ajewelry direct sales company pays its consultants based on recruiting new members. question 1 options: the company is running a pyramid scheme, which is illegal. the company is running a pyramid scheme, which is legal. the company has implemented a legal and ethical plan for growth. the company uses this method of compensation to reduce the fee for the product sample kit.

Ummit record company is negotiating with two banks for a $157,000 loan. fidelity bank requires a compensating balance of 24 percent, discounts the loan, and wants to be paid back in four quarterly payments. southwest bank requires a compensating balance of 12 percent, does not discount the loan, but wants to be paid back in 12 monthly installments. the stated rate for both banks is 9 percent. compensating balances will be subtracted from the $157,000 in determining the available funds in part a. a-1. calculate the effective interest rate for fidelity bank and southwest bank. (do not round intermediate calculations. input your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places.) a-2. which loan should summit accept? southwest bank fidelity bank b. recompute the effective cost of interest, assuming that summit ordinarily maintains $37,680 at each bank in deposits that will serve as compensating balances

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?