Consider a seller who must sell a single private value good. there are two potential buyers, each with a valuation that can take on one of three values, θi ∈ {0, 1, 2}, each value occurring with an equal probability of 1/3 . the players’ values are independently drawn. the seller will offer the good using a second-price sealed-bid auction, but he can set a reserve price of r ≥ 0 that modifies the rules of the auction as follows. if both bids are below r then neither bidder obtains the good and it is destroyed. if both bids are at or above r then the regular auction rules prevail. if only one bid is at or above r then that bidder obtains the good and pays r to the seller.(a) is it still a weakly dominant strategy for each player to bid his valuation when r > 0? (b) what is the expected revenue of the seller when r = 0 (no reserve price)? (c) what is the expected revenue of the seller when r = 1? (d) what explains the difference between your answers to (b) and (c)?