Billy davidson operates billy's worm farm in mississippi. davidson raises worms for fishing. what is the cost per box of worms sold?

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Answer the following questions using the banker’s algorithm: a. illustrate that the system is in a safe state by demonstrating an order in which the processes may complete. b. if a request from process p1 arrives for (1, 1, 0, 0), can the request be granted immediately? c. if a request from process p

Let's consider a hypothetical airline, mudlarks airlines. on one of its flights, precious records show that about 15% of people who had tickets for the flights did not take the flight. there are 120 seats on the plane. 1. how many tickets should mudlarks airlines sell for this flight? 2. as an added consideration, suppose that tickets on this flight cost a flat rate of $250. in addition, mudlarks airlines must give any traveler who purchased a seat for the flight, but who cannot travel due to overbooking, a $400 certificate for their trouble. does this change your answer in question one? now, suppose that mudlarks airlines forms a partnership itch another airline, puffin air. their agreement allocates 100 seats on the flight to mudlarks airlines and another 20 seats to puffin air. the 2 airlines sell tickets for the flight independently of each other. 3. assuming the same 15% no show percent for each airline, how many tickets should each sell?