What effect does education have on income and unemployment

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Consider a small island country whose only industry is weaving. the following table shows information about the small economy in two different years. complete the table by calculating physical capital per worker as well as labor productivity. hint: recall that productivity is defined as the amount of goods and services a worker can produce per hour. in this problem, measure productivity as the quantity of goods per hour of labor. year physical capital labor force physical capital per worker labor hours output labor productivity (looms) (workers) (looms) (hours) (garments) (garments per hour of labor) 2024 160 40 1,800 14,400 2025 180 60 3,900 23,400

How does the plaintiff, mrs. wood, try to implicate the gun manufacturer ( who testifies, what do they say, what evidence is introduced)?