The body of a short, 20-minute presentation should focus on:

4. suppose that pollution in a neighborhood comes from two factories, with marginal benefit curves given by mb1 = 12 – p1 and mb2 = 8 – p2. the level of pollution in the neighborhood is given by p = p1 + p2. the government wants to limit pollution by instituting a pollution-rights market. the government’s desired level of p is 10, so it prints 10 pollution rights and offers them for sale to the firms.a)find the equilibrium selling price of a pollution right, as well as the allocation of rights (and hence pollution levels) across the two factories. b)repeat part (a) for the case where the government’s desired level of pollution equals 14. c)comment on the usefulness of a pollution rights market in achieving efficient levels of pollution abatement.

Oakmont company has an opportunity to manufacture and sell a new product for a four-year period. the company’s discount rate is 18%. after careful study, oakmont estimated the following costs and revenues for the new product: cost of equipment needed $ 230,000 working capital needed $ 84,000 overhaul of the equipment in year two $ 9,000 salvage value of the equipment in four years $ 12,000 annual revenues and costs: sales revenues $ 400,000 variable expenses $ 195,000 fixed out-of-pocket operating costs $ 85,000 when the project concludes in four years the working capital will be released for investment elsewhere within the company. click here to view exhibit 12b-1 and exhibit 12b-2, to determine the appropriate discount factor(s) using tables.

Suppose the marginal damage and marginal benefit curves in a polluted neighborhood are md = p/3 and mb = 4 – p. also, suppose that transactions costs are low, so that the consumers and the firm can bargain. we saw that in this case, the socially-optimal level of pollution is achieved. start by computing the socially-optimal p. then, for each of the following cases, compute the amount of money transferred through the bargaining process, and indicate who pays whom (i.e., whether consumers pay the firm, or vice versa). also, compute the gains to each party relative to the status quo (i.e., the starting point of the bargaining process).a)consumers have the right to clean air; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.b)consumers have the right to clean air; consumers are dominant in the bargaining process.c)firm has the right to pollute; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.d)firm has the right to pollute; consumers are dominant in the bargaining proces