A fashionable store downtown has 10 purses for sale for $100 each. When the store opened this morning, 30 people were in line to buy one. Each person in line wants to buy only one purse. What was the quantity of purses demanded at $100

Which of the following is not a characteristic of enterprise applications that cause challenges in implementation? a. they introduce "switching costs," making the firm dependent on the vendor. b. they cause integration difficulties as every vendor uses different data and processes. c. they are complex and time consuming to implement. d. they support "best practices" for each business process and function. e. they require sweeping changes to business processes to work with the software.

Ardmore farm and seed has an inventory dilemma. they have been selling a brand of very popular insect spray for the past year. they have never really analyzed the costs incurred from ordering and holding the inventory and currently fave a large stock of the insecticide in the warehouse. they estimate that it costs $25 to place an order, and it costs $0.25 per gallon to hold the spray. the annual requirements total 80,000 gallons for a 365 day year.a. assuming that 10,000 gallons are ordered each time an order is placed, estimate the annual inventory costs.b. calculate the eoq.c. given the eoq calculated in part b., how many orders should be placed and what is the average inventory balance? d. if it takes seven days to receive an order from suppliers, at what inventory level should ardmore place another order?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?