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James is an employee in the widget inspection department of xyz systems, a government contractor. james was part of a 3-person inspection team that found a particular batch of widgets did not meet the exacting requirements of the u.s. government. in order to meet the tight deadline and avoid penalties under the contract, james' boss demanded that the batch of widgets be sent in fulfillment of the government contract. when james found out, he went to the vice president of the company and reported the situation. james was demoted by his boss, and no longer works on government projects. james has a:

In myanmar, six laborers, each making the equivalent of $ 2.50 per day, can produce 40 units per day. in china, ten laborers, each making the equivalent of $ 2.25 per day, can produce 48 units. in billings comma montana, two laborers, each making $ 60.00 per day, can make 102 units. based on labor cost per unit only, the most economical location to produce the item is china , with a labor cost per unit of $ . 05. (enter your response rounded to two decimal places.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?