Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator who chooses the best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a cost of $200,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires lawyers or if both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win three-quarters of the time. 1. Diagram this simultaneous move game.
2. What is the Nash Equilibrium of the game?
3. Would the sides want to ban lawyers?

Case in point 1.2 suppose you work in the it department of global hotels, a multinational hotel chain. global hotels runs several specialized business support systems, including a guest reservations system that was developed in-house to meet the requirements of a large company with worldwide operations. guests can make one-stop online reservations by visiting global's website, which has links to all major travel industry sites. global hotels just acquired momma's, a regional chain of 20 motels in western canada. momma's uses a vertical reservations package suitable for small- to medium-sized businesses and a generic accounting and finance package. should momma's use global hotels' information systems or continue with its own? in your answer, consider issues such as business profiles, business processes, system interactivity, edi, ecommerce, and the characteristics of both information systems. what additional information would be to you in making a recommendation?

An investment offers a total return of 18 percent over the coming year. janice yellen thinks the total real return on this investment will be only 14 percent. what does janice believe the inflation rate will be over the next year?

Suppose there is a 6 percent increase in the price of good x and a resulting 6 percent decrease in the quantity of x demanded. price elasticity of demand for x is a. 0 b. 6 c. 1 d. 36