Business, 09.07.2021 04:50 tori6886

What is my level of education if I just finished 10th grade?

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Business, 22.06.2019 20:30

Before the tools that have come from computational psychiatry are ready to be used in everyday practice by psychiatrics, what is needed

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Business, 22.06.2019 21:00

Roberto and reagan are both 25 percent owner/managers for bright light inc. roberto runs the retail store in sacramento, ca, and reagan runs the retail store in san francisco, ca. bright light inc. generated a $125,000 profit companywide made up of a $75,000 profit from the sacramento store, a ($25,000) loss from the san francisco store, and a combined $75,000 profit from the remaining stores. if bright light inc. is an s corporation, how much income will be allocated to roberto?

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Business, 22.06.2019 22:40

In a fixed-term, level-payment reverse mortgage, sometimes called a reverse annuity mortgage, or ram, a lender agrees to pay the homeowner a monthly payment, or annuity, and expects to be repaid from the homeowner’s equity when he or she sells the home or obtains other financing to pay off the ram. consider a household that owns a $150,000 home free and clear of mortgage debt. the ram lender agrees to a $100,000 ram for 10 years at 6 percent. assume payments are made annually, at the beginning of each year to the homeowner. calculate the annual payment on the ram.

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?