Prompt What is market information?

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Areal estate agent is considering changing her cell phone plan. there are three plans to choose from, all of which involve a monthly service charge of $20. plan a has a cost of $.42 a minute for daytime calls and $.17 a minute for evening calls. plan b has a charge of $.52 a minute for daytime calls and $.15 a minute for evening calls. plan c has a flat rate of $80 with 275 minutes of calls allowed per month and a charge of $.38 per minute beyond that, day or evening.a. determine the total charge under each plan for this case: 150 minutes of day calls and 70 minutes of evening calls in a month. (do not round intermediate calculations. round your answer to 2 decimal places. omit the "$" sign in your response.)c. if the agent will use the service for daytime calls, over what range of call minutes will each plan be optimal? (round each answer to the nearest whole number.include the indifference point itself in each answer.)d. suppose that the agent expects both daytime and evening calls. at what point (i.e., percentage of total call minutes used for daytime calls) would she be indifferent between plans a and b?

Evan company reports net income of $232,000 each year and declares an annual cash dividend of $100,000. the company holds net assets of $2,130,000 on january 1, 2017. on that date, shalina purchases 40 percent of evan's outstanding common stock for $1,066,000, which gives it the ability to significantly influence evan. at the purchase date, the excess of shalina’s cost over its proportionate share of evan’s book value was assigned to goodwill. on december 31, 2019, what is the investment in evan company balance (equity method) in shalina’s financial records?