32.3A Show the journal entries needed to correct the following errors: (a) Purchases £1,410 on credit from A Ray had been entered in B Roy's account.
(b) A cheque of £94 paid for printing had been entered in the cash column of the cash book
instead of in the bank column.
(c) Sale of goods £734 on credit to D Rolls had been entered in error in D Rollo's account.
(d) Purchase of goods on credit L Hand £819 entered in the correct accounts in error as £891.
(e) Cash paid to G Boyd £64 entered on the debit side of the cash book and the credit side of
G Boyd's account.
(f) A sale of fittings £320 had been entered in the Sales account.
(g) Cash withdrawn from bank £200 had been entered in the cash column on the credit side of
the cash book, and in the bank column on the debit side.
(h) Purchase of goods £1,182 has been entered in error in the Furnishings account.

There is a cost associated with each source of financing. discuss the cost of debt, preferred stock, common stock, and retained earnings in detail. which source of financing is typically less expensive? why? why do financial managers try to determine the optimal capital mix? be specific.

Which of the following best explains how trade enables greater specialization among producers? a. trade diversifies the market by bringing specialized goods from around the world. b. trade requires distribution networks and adds one more step to the production process. c. trade enables producers to open up new markets for their goods and services. d. trade allows people to focus on one kind of production and trade for their other needs.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?