A monopoly sells its good in the U. S. and Japanese markets. The American inverse demand function is ​, and the Japanese inverse demand function is ​, where both​ prices, pa and pj​, are measured in dollars. The​ firm's marginal cost of production is m​ = ​$ in both countries. If the firm can prevent​ resales, what price will it charge in both​ markets? ​(Hint​: The monopoly determines its optimal​ (monopoly) price in each country separately because customers cannot resell the​ good.) The equilibrium price in Japan is ​$ nothing. ​ (round your answer to the nearest​ penny)

Because of the violent nature of the sport, professional american football players are at risk of suffering concussions (or brain injuries) during the violent collisions that occur between players during the game. violent collisions involving hits to the head are particularly risky. suppose the commissioner of the national football league (nfl) institutes a rule requiring players to wear a new, lighter helmet that is designed to reduce head trauma during collisions between players on the field. while the new helmets the probability of a concussion resulting from each individual collision, at the same time the new helmets could also give football players an incentive to play more , which could potentially the amount of violent collisions and thus the number of concussions suffered by nfl players, all else equal.