Describe a real or made up example of word of mouth promotion. why do you think people were motivated to spread this message to others?

Stocks a, b, and c are similar in some respects: each has an expected return of 10% and a standard deviation of 25%. stocks a and b have returns that are independent of one another; i.e., their correlation coefficient, r, equals zero. stocks a and c have returns that are negatively correlated with one another; i.e., r is less than 0. portfolio ab is a portfolio with half of its money invested in stock a and half in stock b. portfolio ac is a portfolio with half of its money invested in stock a and half invested in stock c. which of the following statements is correct? a. portfolio ab has a standard deviation that is greater than 25%.b. portfolio ac has an expected return that is less than 10%.c. portfolio ac has a standard deviation that is less than 25%.d. portfolio ab has a standard deviation that is equal to 25%.e. portfolio ac has an expected return that is greater than 25%.

What could cause a production possibilities curve to move down and to the left? a.) a nation loses land after being defeated in a war. b.) an increase in the use of computer technology speeds up production c.) a baby boom 20 years ago results in a large number of young adults in the population today. d.) thousands of investors from overseas invest money in a nations economy.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?