A machine purchased 3 years ago for $140,000 is currently too slow to satisfy increased demand. The machine can be upgraded now for $90,000 or sold to a smaller company for $40,000. The current machine will have an annual operating cost of $85,000 per year and a $30,000 salvage value in 3 years. If upgraded, the presently owned machine will definitely be retained for 3 more years. The replacement, which will serve the company now and for at least 8 years, will cost $223,000. Its salvage value will be $50,000 for years 1 through 5, $20,000 after 6 years, and $10,000 thereafter. It will have an estimated operating cost of $65,000 per year. The company asks you to perform an economic analysis at 15% per year using a 3-year planning horizon. Should the company replace the presently owned machine now, or do it 3 years from now

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?