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Business, 23.11.2020 17:40 tinalmath

(Please Help) What law gave enforcement authority to the equal employment opportunity commission? A. The Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Act of 1994
B. The Equal Pay Act of 1963
C. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964
D. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964

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