In a command economy, Individuals fellow thir self-interest without government intervention True or False İf false, correct the statement.

1. all other things equal, according to the law of demand, when the price of a good falls, the demand for the good falls the demand for the good rises the quantity demanded of the good falls the quantity demanded of the good rises 2. when a market is in equilibrium, the quantity of the good that buyers are willing and able to buy exactly equals the quantity that sellers are willing and able to sell cannot be determined is less than the quantity that sellers are willing and able to sell is greater than the quantity that sellers are willing and able to sell 3. which of the following factors does not influence the demand for a good or service? consumer (buyer) income the price of related goods the number of sellers buyer expectations 4. when the number of sellers in a market increases, demand rises supply rises the price rises, all else equal the number of buyers falls

When the price is the equilibrium price, we would expect there to be a causing the market to put pressure on the price until it went back to the equilibrium price. a. above; surplus; upward b. above; shortage; downward c. below; surplus; upward d. below; shortage; downward e. above; surplus; downward?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?