Whistle Stop pays a constant annual dividend of $4 on its stock. The company will maintain this dividend for the next 3 years and will then cease paying dividends forever. What is the current price per share if the required return on this stock is 15.6 percent

At december 31, 2016, pina corporation had the following stock outstanding. 10% cumulative preferred stock, $100 par, 107,810 shares $10,781,000 common stock, $5 par, 4,026,000 shares 20,130,000 during 2017, pina did not issue any additional common stock. the following also occurred during 2017. income from continuing operations before taxes $21,950,000 discontinued operations (loss before taxes) $3,505,000 preferred dividends declared $1,078,100 common dividends declared $2,300,000 effective tax rate 35 % compute earnings per share data as it should appear in the 2017 income statement of pina corporation

This activity is important because as a marketing manager, you must allocate resources to reach your target market. during the strategic marketing process, managers move through three important phases to determine how to optimally allocate resources: a planning phase, an implementation phase, and an evaluation phase. in this interactive exercise, you are asked to review various strategic marketing actions and determine where in the strategic marketing process the action would occur. the goal of this exercise is to demonstrate your understanding of the strategic marketing process and related marketing actions.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?