Styling Shoes, LLC, filed its 20X8 Form 1065 on March 15, 20X9. Styling had three members with the following ownership interests and tax bases at the beginning of 20X8: (1) Jane, a member with a 25 percent profits and capital interest and a $8,500 outside basis, (2) Joe, a member with a 45 percent profits and capital interest and a $13,500 outside basis, and (3) Jack, a member with a 30 percent profits and capital interest and a $5,500 outside basis. The following items were reported on Styling's Schedule K for the year: ordinary income of $107,000, Section 1231 gain of $18,500, charitable contributions of $28,500, and tax-exempt income of $6,500. In addition, Styling received an additional bank loan of $15,500 during 20X8. What is Jane's tax basis after adjustment for her share of these items? A) 32,625.B) $36,250.C) $39,000.D) $64,250.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?