On January 1, 20X8, Polo Corporation acquired 75 percent of Stallion Company's voting common stock for $300,000. At the time of the combination, Stallion reported common stock outstanding of $200,000 and retained earnings of $150,000, and the fair value of the noncontrolling interest was $100,000. The book value of Stallion's net assets approximated market value except for patents that had a market value of $50,000 more than their book value. The patents had a remaining economic life of ten years at the date of the business combination. Stallion reported net income of $40,000 and paid dividends of $10,000 during 20X8.
Required:
a) Based on the preceding information, what balance will Polo report as its investment in Stallion at December 31, 20X8, assuming Polo uses the equity method in accounting for its investment?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?