Business, 01.06.2020 05:57 QueenNerdy889

Investing is best for
?

Answers: 3

Show answers

Another question on Business

Business, 22.06.2019 08:30

Hi inr 2002 class! i just uploaded a detailed study guide for this class. you can check-out a free preview by following the link below feel free to reach-out to me if you need a study buddy or have any questions. goodluck!

Answers: 1

Answer

Business, 22.06.2019 17:30

One of your new suppliers, kim, has been hearing rumors about your firm’s lack of capability to deliver high quality products and writes an email asking you to address the claims being made. in replying to her, you want to be sure that you are very clear and leave no room for misinterpretation. which of the following aspects of effective communication should you give the most attention? (a) making sure you understand kim’s areas of expertise. (b) supporting your reply with relevant data and facts. (c) establishing your credibility as an expert. (d) paying attention to implied communications.

Answers: 2

Answer

Business, 22.06.2019 19:30

When it is 4: 00 a.m. in halifax, it is 1: 00 p.m. in karachi, and when it is 9: 00 a.m. in karachi, it is 5: 00 a.m. in warsaw. mary left halifax to fly to karachi, but she accidentally left her watch on warsaw time. according to mary’s watch, she left halifax at 9: 40 p.m. on monday. the local time when she arrived at karachi was 3: 00 p.m. tuesday. how long was mary’s flight? a. 9 hours, 20 minutes b. 13 hours, 20 minutes c. 14 hours, 20 minutes d. 17 hours, 20 minutes

Answers: 1

Answer

Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?