Three people have access to one pound of chocolate. Any majority—two or three people—may control the allocation of this chocolate. Each person cares only about the amount of chocolate she obtains. a. Model the situation as a coalitional game and specify the worth of each coalition. b. Verify that this game is cohesive and has transferable payoff. c. Show that the core of this game is empty.

Wo firms, a and b, each currently dump 50 tons of chemicals into the local river. the government has decided to reduce the pollution and from now on will require a pollution permit for each ton of pollution dumped into the river. it costs firm a $100 for each ton of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river, and it costs firm b $50 for each ton of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river. the government gives each firm 20 pollution permits. government officials are not sure whether to allow the firms to buy or sell the pollution permits to each other. what is the total cost of reducing pollution if firms are not allowed to buy and sell pollution permits from each other? what is the total cost of reducing pollution if the firms are allowed to buy and sell permits from each other? a. $3,000; $1,500 b. $4,500; $3,500 c. $4,500; $4,000 d. $4,500; $2,500

Opportunity cost is calculated by which of the following? a. adding the value of all lost opportunities. b. subtracting all costs from the total benefit. c. calculating the cost of time, energy, and sacrifice. d. finding the value of the best option that is not chosen.

The biweekly taxable wages for the employees of rite shop follow. compute the fica taxes for each employee and the employers fica taxes