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Business, 05.05.2020 00:46 canonmille2

A year ago, you graduated from college and decided to open your own computer software company. Over the past year, your firm generated $500,000 in revenue. You hired two software engineers and paid each of them $150,000 over the past year. You also purchased computer equipment that cost a total of $30,000. To save money, you decided to use the basement of your house for the business. Previously, you had rented this space to a tenant for $6,000 per year. Instead of opening your own business, you could have gone to work for Microsoft and earned $200,000 over the past year.

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A year ago, you graduated from college and decided to open your own computer software company. Over...
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