Alma's Recording Studio rents studio time to musicians in 2-hour blocks. Each session includes the use of the studio facilities, a digital recording of the performance, and a professional music producer/mixer. Anticipated annual volume is 1,230 sessions. The company has invested $2,337,000 in the studio and expects a return on investment (ROI) of 19%. Budgeted costs for the coming year are as follows. Per Session Total Direct materials (CDs, etc.) $ 19.95 Direct labor $414.00 Variable overhead $ 49.00 Fixed overhead $1,172,190 Variable selling and administrative expenses $ 43.00 Fixed selling and administrative expenses $616,230 Determine the total cost per session. (Round answer to 2 decimal places, e. G. 10.50.)

What is the difference between an "i" statement and a "you" statement? a. the "i" statement is non-confrontational b. the "you" statement is non-confrontational c. the "i" statement is argumentative d. the "you" statement is neutral in tone select the best answer from the choices provided

Abus pass costs $5 per week. which of the following equations shows the total cost in dollars, t, of the bus pass for a certain number of weeks, w? t = 5w w = 5t t = 5 + w w = 5 + t

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?