Ghost, Inc., has no debt outstanding and a total market value of $251,600. Earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT, are projected to be $41,000 if economic conditions are normal. If there is strong expansion in the economy, then EBIT will be 15 percent higher. If there is a recession, then EBIT will be 26 percent lower. The company is considering a $135,000 debt issue with an interest rate of 8 percent. The proceeds will be used to repurchase shares of stock. There are currently 7,400 shares outstanding. The company has a tax rate of 24 percent, a market-to-book ratio of 1.0, and the stock price remains constant.

a-1.
Calculate earnings per share (EPS) under each of the three economic scenarios before any debt is issued.

a-2. Calculate the percentage changes in EPS when the economy expands or enters a recession.

b-1. Calculate earnings per share (EPS) under each of the three economic scenarios assuming the company goes through with recapitalization.

b-2. Given the recapitalization, calculate the percentage changes in EPS when the economy expands or enters a recession.

technology is the application of knowledge and tools to solve problems and perform tasks more efficiently. t/f

Xinhong company is considering replacing one of its manufacturing machines. the machine has a book value of $39,000 and a remaining useful life of 5 years, at which time its salvage value will be zero. it has a current market value of $49,000. variable manufacturing costs are $33,300 per year for this machine. information on two alternative replacement machines follows. alternative a alternative b cost $ 115,000 $ 117,000 variable manufacturing costs per year 22,900 10,100 1. calculate the total change in net income if alternative a and b is adopted. 2. should xinhong keep or replace its manufacturing machine

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?