Lighter Than Air, Inc., and Mario enter into a contract for a sale of a hang glider. Lighter Than air, a merchant who deals in goods of the kind sold, makes implied and express warranties in connection with the sale. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty act was designed to prevent deception of warranty rules

a. Displacing the UCC as the primary source of warranty rules
b. Making warranties easier to understand
c. prohibiting disclaimers of warranties
d. requiring sellers to give written warranties for consumer goods

Your mother's well-diversified portfolio has an expected return of 12.0% and a beta of 1.20. she is in the process of buying 100 shares of safety corp. at $10 a share and adding it to her portfolio. safety has an expected return of 15.0% and a beta of 2.00. the total value of your current portfolio is $9,000. what will the expected return and beta on the portfolio be after the purchase of the safety stock?

Turrubiates corporation makes a product that uses a material with the following standards standard quantity 8.0 liters per unit standard price $2.50 per liter standard cost $20.00 per unit the company budgeted for production of 3,800 units in april, but actual production was 3,900 units. the company used 32,000 liters of direct material to produce this output. the company purchased 20,100 liters of the direct material at $2.6 per liter. the direct materials purchases variance is computed when the materials are purchased. the materials quantity variance for april is:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?