In an attempt to secure his 802.11b wireless network, Bob decides to use strategic antenna positioning. He places the antennas for the access points near the center of the building. For those access points near the outer edge of the building he uses semi-directional antennas that face towards the buildings center. There is a large parking lot and outlying field surrounding the building that extends out half a mile around the building. Bob figures that with this and his placement of antennas, his wireless network will be safe from attack. Which of the following statements is true?

A Bob's network will not be safe until he also enables WEP
B. With the 300-foot limit of a wireless signal, Bob's network is safe
C. Bob's network will be safe but only if he doesn't switch to 802.11a
D. Wireless signals can be detected from miles away, Bob's network is not safe

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?