Weatherhead inc. has provided the following data for the month of march. there were no beginning inventories; consequently, the direct materials, direct labor, and manufacturing overhead applied listed below are all for the current month. work in process finished goods cost of goods sold total direct materials $ 4,240 $ 14,740 $ 41,660 $ 60,640 direct labor 10,000 29,480 83,880 123,360 manufacturing overhead applied 5,860 11,020 35,060 51,940 total $ 20,100 $ 55,240 $ 160,600 $ 235,940 manufacturing overhead for the month was overapplied by $4,300. the corporation allocates any underapplied or overapplied manufacturing overhead among work in process, finished goods, and cost of goods sold at the end of the month on the basis of the manufacturing overhead applied during the month in those accounts. the work in process inventory at the end of march after allocation of any underapplied or overapplied manufacturing overhead for the month is closest to: round intermediate percentage computations to the nearest whole percent.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?