Consider the following statements about transfer pricing: i. income taxes and import duties are an important consideration when setting a transfer price for companies that pursue international commerce. ii. transfer prices cannot be used by organizations in the service industry. iii. transfer prices are totally cost-based in nature, not market-based. which of the above statements is (are) true?

Alandowner and his neighbor purchased adjoining undeveloped lots. after both built homes on their respective lots, the landowner suggested to the neighbor that a common driveway be built where the two lots joined. the neighbor agreed. the landowner and the neighbor split the cost of constructing the driveway and entered into a written agreement to equally share the costs of its upkeep and maintenance. the agreement was recorded in the county recorder's office. two years later, the neighbor built a new driveway located entirely on his lot. the common driveway, which the landowner continued to use but which the neighbor no longer used, began to deteriorate. the landowner asked the neighbor for money to maintain the common driveway, but the neighbor refused to contribute. three years later, the neighbor conveyed his lot to a friend. the friend entered into possession and used only the driveway built by the neighbor. by this time, the common driveway had deteriorated badly and contained numerous potholes. the landowner asked the friend to pay half of what it would take to repair the common driveway. the friend refused. the landowner repaired the driveway and sued the friend for 50% of the cost of repairs. will the landowner prevail?

Which of the following represents an unlimited queue? a. toll booth serving automobiles on the interstateb. drive through lane at a fast food restaurantc. faculty office with limited seating during office hoursd. restaurant with no outside seating and limited capacity due to fire departments restrictionse. small barbershop with only 5 chairs for waiting customers

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?