On january 2, cohan company acquired 40% of the outstanding stock of sanger company for $500,000. for the year ended december 31, sanger company earned income of $80,000 and paid dividends of $30,000. prepare the entries for cohan company for the purchase of the stock, the share of sanger income, and the dividends received from sanger company. refer to the chart of accounts for exact wording of account titles.

1.     regarding general guidelines for the preparation of successful soups, which of the following statements is true? a. thick soups made with starchy vegetables may thin during storage. b. soups should be seasoned throughout the cooking process. c. finish a cream soup well before serving it to moderate the flavor. d. consommés take quite a long time to cool. student c   incorrect

M. cotteleer electronics supplies microcomputer circuitry to a company that incorporates microprocessors into refrigerators and other home appliances. one of the components has an annual demand of 235 units, and this is constant throughout the year. carrying cost is estimated to be $1.25 per unit per year, and the ordering (setup) cost is $21 per order. a) to minimize cost, how many units should be ordered each time an order is placed? b) how many orders per year are needed with the optimal policy? c) what is the average inventory if costs are minimized? d) suppose that the ordering cost is not $21, and cotteleer has been ordering 125 units each time an order is placed. for this order policy (of q = 125) to be optimal, determine what the ordering cost would have to be.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?