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Suppose the marginal damage and marginal benefit curves in a polluted neighborhood are md = p/3 and mb = 4 – p. also, suppose that transactions costs are low, so that the consumers and the firm can bargain. we saw that in this case, the socially-optimal level of pollution is achieved. start by computing the socially-optimal p. then, for each of the following cases, compute the amount of money transferred through the bargaining process, and indicate who pays whom (i.e., whether consumers pay the firm, or vice versa). also, compute the gains to each party relative to the status quo (i.e., the starting point of the bargaining process).a)consumers have the right to clean air; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.b)consumers have the right to clean air; consumers are dominant in the bargaining process.c)firm has the right to pollute; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.d)firm has the right to pollute; consumers are dominant in the bargaining proces

Why do you think the compensation plans differ at the two firms? in particular, why do you think kaufmann’s pays commissions to salespeople, while parkleigh does not? why does parkleigh offer employees discounts on purchases, while kaufmann’s does not?

T-comm makes a variety of products. it is organized in two divisions, north and south. the managers for each division are paid, in part, based on the financial performance of their divisions. the south division normally sells to outside customers but, on occasion, also sells to the north division. when it does, corporate policy states that the price must be cost plus 20 percent to ensure a "fair" return to the selling division. south received an order from north for 300 units. south's planned output for the year had been 1,200 units before north's order. south's capacity is 1,500 units per year. the costs for producing those 1,200 units follow