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Business, 22.11.2019 20:31 judyd452

Creighton applies to bigdata corporation for a position as a software engineer. creighton's resume lists training in computers or programming and background as an engineer when in fact he has neither. after creighton is hired, bigdata learns the truth. bigdata a) not rescind the contractb) rescind the contract on the basis of .fraudc) rescind the contract on the basis of mistake. d) rescind the contract on the basis of undue influence.

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Creighton applies to bigdata corporation for a position as a software engineer. creighton's resume l...
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