Aclient with the diagnosis of breast cancer is scheduled to receive radiation therapy to the affected area. the nurse teaches the client about how to care for the area that will be irradiated. which client statement indicates the nurse needs to follow up?

Aceramics manufacturer sold cups last year for $7.50 each. variable costs of manufacturing were $2.25 per unit. the company needed to sell 20,000 cups to break even. net income was $5,040. this year, the company expects the price per cup to be $9.00; variable manufacturing costs to increase 33.3%; and fixed costs to increase 10%. how many cups (rounded) does the company need to sell this year to break even?

Magic realm, inc., has developed a new fantasy board game. the company sold 15,000 games last year at a selling price of $20 per game. fixed expenses associated with the game total $182,000 per year, and variable expenses are $6 per game. production of the game is entrusted to a printing contractor. variable expenses consist mostly of payments to this contractor.required: 1-a. prepare a contribution format income statement for the game last year.1-b. compute the degree of operating leverage.2. management is confident that the company can sell 58,880 games next year (an increase of 12,880 games, or 28%, over last year). given this assumption: a. what is the expected percentage increase in net operating income for next year? b. what is the expected amount of net operating income for next year? (do not prepare an income statement; use the degree of operating leverage to compute your answer.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?