Business, 28.08.2019 00:30 tanafloe6264
You are given the following best-response functions for duopoly firms playing a bertrand price-setting game: p 1 equals 25 plus 0.5 m 1 plus 0.25 p 2, and p 2 equals 25 plus 0.5 m 2 plus 0.25 p 1, where m 1 and m 2 are the marginal costs for firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. let m 1 equals m 2 equals $ 10. solve for the bertrand equilibrium prices. firm 1 $ nothing (round answers to the nearest penny) firm 2 $ nothing (round answers to the nearest penny)
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