This question is based on example #2 in the chapter 4 example packet. this example uses abc to cost two different models of tv's. assume all the data is the same as the problem in the packet, with the exception of the following numbers for the activity allocation base for all the medium tv's (3000 tv's) produced.
# of material handling orders 359
# of machine hours 14551
# of packaging hours
assume that the activity based overhead rates do not change from what was calculated in the problem ($300 per material order handled, $14 per machine hour, and $9 per packaging hour). what is the total cost of producing 1 medium tv, including direct materials, direct labor and manufacturing overhead? hint: remember that the $660,000 for direct materials and $216,000 for direct labor were for all 000 medium tv's produced. likewise, the overhead numbers that you will arrive at using the new activity allocation base numbers are for 3000 tv's. so don't forget to divide your final answer by 3000 to arrive at the cost of 1 tv. round your final answer to the nearest whole number, and don't enter dollar signs.

Prairie, inc. produces one single product. it has an annual capacity of 10,000 units, but currently uses only 80% of it. each unit is sold for $50 and requires direct material worth $30 and direct labor worth $5. manufacturing overhead cost is $10 per unit of which 70% is variable. should a special order to sell 1,000 units at $44 be accepted? yes no

The discussion of the standards for selection of peanuts that will be used in m& ms and the placement of the m& m logo on the candies speaks to which building block of a sustainable competitive advantage:

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?